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Hi 
The Defendant/Counterclaimant/Appellant Deanna Pugh (hereinafter 
"Deanna") hereby submits the following arguments in reply to the 
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant/Appellee Christopherson, White, Farris & Utley, 
P.C.'s (hereinafter "the Firm") Brief of Appellee: 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AS TO ALL ISSUES 
This Court, on appeal from summary judgment, reviews the trial 
court's grant of a motion for summary judgment for correctness, affording 
no deference to the trial court, and all inferences which may be drawn from 
the facts should be made in the non-moving party's favor. Ford v. American 
Express Fin. Advisors, 2004 UT 70, 98 P.3d 15. In addition, Deanna 
submits that the trial court abused his discretion by applying the wrong 
standard of law to the Firm's breach of contract cause of action and also 
failed to require the Firm's compliance with Rule 73(b) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Additionally, this Court must review the trial court's ruling 
in this case as a question of law, reviewing for correctness, and affording no 
deference to the trial court. Brown v. Glover, 2000 UT 89, 16 P.3d 540. 
DISPUTE TO FIRM'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As to paragraph 4 in the Firm's Brief of Appellee, Deanna disputes 
that the fee agreement provided for contractual interest rate of eighteen 
percent per annum to accrue upon "any unpaid balance due to Plaintiff by 
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Defendant." The fee agreement provides for interest upon "any amounts 
not paid by retainer or within thirty (30) days of the date of the billing 
statement" (See Addendum at Al, the Fee Agreement.) As shown 
throughout Deanna's Brief of Appellant and throughout documents provided 
to the trial court, a substantial amount of the Firm's requested and granted 
"unpaidfees" were never submitted to Deanna for payment through the 
Firm's billing statements. 
As to paragraph 5, Deanna established a genuine dispute of material 
fact as to whether Barney & McKenna exchanged legal services with the 
Firm, basically providing services in trade rather than actually incurring 
attorney fees and costs. (See Record Index p. 424, Defendant's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Affidavit of Deanna Pugh, paragraph 12.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
When viewed for correctness, there are many material issues of 
disputed facts in this mater that preclude summary judgment against Deanna. 
Further, when viewed for correctness, the trial court granted the Firm 
summary judgment upon its own breach of contract action by applying the 
wrong standard of law. The standard of law that was used was the three part 
test for breach of contract claims that the Firm offered as the correct legal 
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standard, namely that a plaintiff must establish invasion of a legal right, a 
causal connection between the legal wrong suffered and damages claim, and 
sufficiently certain damages. (See Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, Record Index 
p. 348; see also Addendum at A7, paragraph 2 of Summary Ruling on 
Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment, Record Index p. 656.) 
When viewed for correctness, the trial court failed to apply the correct 
standard of law in a breach of contract cause of action in the context of legal 
representation and an attorney-client relationship. See Bennett v. Jones, 
70 P.3d 17, 26 (Utah 2003). In addition, Deanna established many material 
facts disputing the Firm's performance of its contractual duties under the fee 
agreement and under their attorney-client relationship. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Improperly Granted Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Judgment On Its Breach of Contract Cause of Action 
Because Plaintiff Failed to Properly Plead and Support Its Cause 
of Action Against Deanna. 
A. The Plaintiff Failed to Plead the Necessary Elements to 
Prevail On Its Breach of Contract Claim Against Deanna. 
The Firm apparently concedes to Deanna's argument that in order to 
prevail on its own breach of contract action Judge Beacham was required by 
law to utilize the four elements of a breach of contract cause of action in the 
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context of legal representation and an attorney-client relationship as 
demonstrated in Bennett v. Jones, 70 P.3d 17, 26 (Utah 2003). However, the 
Firm fails to argue how Judge' Beacham was able to grant its motion for 
siimniiiiv jtiilli"iniill against Deaimn mi i(" INMI Ibji.tili < Il nuliikl Jt linn 
WIH.MI the I; ii in mi in iliilll ill >l in ill i iiinlinn liiiiii siiiiiniaiv (inijiiiiK nt ni in ill1 
u
 the BCMK-U v ones standard of law and did not itself ask 
„ A court to grant its motion for summary judgment upon the Bennett v. 
Jones stand ' 
*u iik; I irm now asserts . ^ i jnowing- in oraei u;
 Hic .M-. \>s 
i r! M f T HninMr
 5 namei> ^lj the existence oi a valid aina 
enforceable contract; (2; p^  -je by the Plaintiff; (3) breach by the 
de fendant; and (4) damages to the Plaintiff resulting from the breach." Th is 
is the first time in its case againstDeanna that tlk am has attempted to 
establish lis heath ill IMNIIMOI I'-mu < I m inn -it'.uimai l iH".iiiii.j iiiiiiilei ihr 
Bennett v. Jones standa- ' 'f * .\ -**'1 to establish 
mother or not the trial ^~*.
 to aummai} judgment appropriately; not 
to rule upon an entirely new" case as presented now m the Firn m *s 
Court's function is to review the law and the facts presented to ihc -i 
coi irt? not to entertain an., entirely lie w case. 
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As shown under the Firm's Issue I of its brief, it now wants to assert 
that it established the required four elements under Bennett v. Jones. 
However, the Firm still fails to assert that that it performed all of its 
contractual obligations. Simply stating that the Firm rendered legal services 
and advanced costs for and in behalf of the Defendant does not establish that 
it performed all of its contractual duties. That is a material fact to which 
should not have allowed for a summary judgment ruling. Deanna filed 
counterclaims against the Firm for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary 
duties, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, thereby 
demonstrating her adamant dispute that the Firm performed its contractual 
obligations. 
In addition, merely stating that the Firm rendered legal services and 
billed for those legal services does not prove that the Firm did not 
overcharge for those legal services, that the fees were fair and reasonable, 
nor does it prove that the Firm actually performed those legal services. 
These are material issues to be proven to a jury. As set forth throughout 
Deanna's causes of action, Deanna asserts the Firm failed to perform its 
contractual obligations on many levels. 
Deanna in her argument opposing the motion for summary judgment, 
on pages 21 and 22, drew the trial court's attention to the Bennett v. Jones 
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case as follows: "Plaintiff fails to assert in its Complaint that it performed 
" "is contractual duties under the contract; therefore, Plaintiffs 
complaint should be dismissed as a matter of law. .*. ^  • 
arpumeiii presented on page ;* oJ (Ins iimlmii liu Minimal y judgineni ulymjj, 
mi inliim m UenneU v. Jones, 70 I' <<l I 7 (I l|,ih MUM) I'l.imliIf"s «-iimpliiint 
made the statement they billed ^vi^-aoii t , but there is no lane1 V i l l U 1 V 
Complaint wherein Plaintiff asserts it performed its duties under the 
• 3 2 ntract." (See Defendant's Memorandum... of Points and .Authorities in 
Op f: • : 'Sition to I 'laintiff s Motion f01 Summary 1mim IIIn,mi111 11I, I<ccoi d h i d e x 
p . 1 2 L ) • - . • 
The Firm in its respoii.se to Deanna's argument above in iici 
opposition to "the Firm's motion for summar> judgment stated the following 
jment: 
c
" n** any ease law refuting 
Plaintiff s . ,; contract claim Instead, Defendant 
makes blin , r ,s without any legal basis 
in case <>*
 voee Defendant's Memorandum 
pages ° !>1aintiff must establish a legal 
right hat a causal link between the 
legal \\. and damages claimed and 
damages a occurred. Gould v. Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 309 P.2d 802, 
805 (Utah 1957); Terry v. Panek, 631 R 2 d 896, 
897 (Utah 1981); Winsness v. M.J. Conoco 
Distributors. Inc.. 593 P 2d 1 ^ i ^ cw»h 
' 9 7 9 ) / ' • 
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(See Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment, Record Index p. 610.) 
The Firm now argues only on appeal that it was required to establish 
the elements as listed in the Bennett v. Jones case. The Firm also now 
asserts for the first time in this case the following: "The State of Utah 
adheres to a liberal notice pleading requirement. (Fishbaugh v. Utah Power 
& Light 969 P.2d 403,406 (Utah 1998))." Further, in its argument, the 
Firm states: "Therefore, under Utah's liberal notice pleading requirements, 
all that is required is that the pleadings be sufficient to give fair notice of the 
nature and basis of the claim asserted and a general indication of the type of 
litigation involved. (Fishbaugh at 406.)" 
The Fishbaugh case cited by the Firm does not address the liberal 
notice pleading requirement as it relates to a case such as this, specifically 
that the trial court granting summary judgment to the moving party on its 
complaint even though the moving party's complaint fails to assert all of the 
required elements and even though the motion for summary judgment itself 
also failed to assert the required elements and the appropriate law supporting 
its motion. Summary judgment was not granted in the Fishbaugh case to the 
City and UP&L against Fishbaugh because his amended complaint failed to 
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state exactly the City & UP&L's duties, but instead, because Fishbaugh 
could not prove an unrelated element of negligence. 
T
 "his case, Deanna did not motion for the trial court to summarily 
dismiss the hum's breath ol conlmcl action midci 11 U ("<\ I1" Unlv '>(» 
liislcail 1 Jciiiiiu clin'i fin liulli * mill i l lrnlniii II Illlln1 iippiopiiiih v IM« II i \ m 
cited by the Firm,, si ipporting its motion for summary nirljmient requesting 
Luia s breach of contract action be dismissed. Further, under the 
Finn's new Fishbaugh-based argument, the Court'erred as a matter of law in 
granting the Firm's motion dismissing Deanna's breac,. ; contract acfiVm 
II iiuiiKi id Hi • h u m '» s l e w , as a n u l l a o l l ; iv ' I In 
hlui i i l inidtY pleading t*"*p1111"11n*11( 
Again, the trial court allowed the Firm to succeed in its case without 
x '»- *
:ng it to prove it performed all of its duties. The Finn had duties of its 
own that are beyond billing for alleged legal services and advancing costs to 
II i (I il in in in i in In i h i i i jL ' i i i t iei i t i c g a i d i n g I l ie h i s h k i i i i ' J i 111I11111 Ih Il i il il 11 aigual 
"SiiiiiluilK, , 111 in ill iff" mi (In inslfiiil .ipponl provided iunph1 nntuv in both its 
Complaint and in the pleading submitted in support of its Motion for 
Summary Judgment, that Plaintiff rendered legal services and advanced 
costs on behalf of the Defendant" Nowhere in this language does the Firm 
assert that it performed ,... ol its contractual duties, either express or imnl 
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However, had the Firm asserted that it performed all of its contractual 
duties, then the facts alleged by Deanna would have created material issues 
because she disputes the billing statements are accurate, fair and reasonable, 
among other material issues relating to her contract. Additionally, nowhere 
in its argument does the Firm assert that the trial court granted summary 
judgment based upon the Bennett v. Jones case either. 
B. The Trial Court Did Err in Granting the Firm's 
"Unpaid Fees" and Interest Upon "Unpaid Fees." 
To be clear, the Firm is the party that provided the "Sample Invoice" 
dated July 15, 2003. The Firm labeled an exhibit to its first denied motion 
for summary judgment as "Sample Invoice." At no time had the Firm 
submitted by mail or otherwise the Sample Invoice to Deanna. The "Sample 
Invoice" was merely an exhibit as shown by the Firm in its argument. The 
trial court entered judgment against Deanna for an amount that included the 
charges stemming from the "Sample Invoice" exhibit and the judgment also 
included interest at the rate of 18 percent per annum upon the amount 
submitted in the "Sample Invoice" exhibit. The fee agreement does not 
address sample invoices, and therefore the trial court erred by including the 
substantial amount of fees never actually billed to Deanna but only 
addressed after initiation of the Firm's claim and after submission of a 
"sample invoice." 
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xAxv mai court, as a matter of law, taking the facts in the light most 
favorable to Deaiina, should have concluded that possibly the Firm 
^-idulently calculated the Sample Invoice fees in its attempt to divert f" 
il i ial court; s attention aw ay Iioni the Ma\ / .'llll \ invoice thai the him, now 
stales i\as n i kid nil IIKIIII in Il in.ippnipiiatoh ni'iili d |ihl pnm I null ill n 
of its lawsuit against Deaiina. Again, had Beanna paid the fees requested in 
its May 7, 2003 invoice, the Firm would clearly not have sued her and the 
Firm would have received the inaccurate, miscalculated-fees requested due 
to a "clerical error." 
II. i toe I rial Court improperly Dismissed Deanna's Counterclaims 
Because Deanna Properly Pled and Supported Each of Her 
Counterclaims at Summary Judgment 
As to Deanna's fraud cause of action, Deanna's counterclaim for 
fraud and her affidavit in support, of her opposition to the Firm's motion for 
summary judgment, if viewed in a light most favorable to Deanna, set forth 
t minimi.- , ' *. v. , . 501UOlio\ \ . illil ^ * I } 2i 1 587 (I J 1 1 Ill ,. 1 999) in< 1 
to overcome summary judgment. 
The Firm argues that there was not an implied agreement to bill fairly 
and accurately and also that the Firm, under the contract, was not obligated 
to communicate wnu beanna rega* her case beanna argues that she 
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would not have retained the Firm had the Firm informed her that they would 
not bill her fairly or accurately or communicate with her about her case. 
Deanna also argues that Mr. Gentry, through his statements and through the 
fee agreement, expressly and through implication, indicated that he would 
do these things. 
However, in the Firm's own arguments, the Firm has stated that it did 
not believe it was required to bill fair, reasonable or even accurate charges, 
nor was it required under the four corners of the agreement to communicate 
with Deanna. These statements alone suggest the Firm was less than honest 
with Deanna when Mr. Gentry encouraged her to retain him. Had Deanna 
known how the Firm operates and the Firm's belief with regard to these 
important issues, she would not have hired the Firm. While Deanna agrees 
that the case of Kraatz v.Heritage Imports. 71 P.3d 188,2003 UT 
App. 201 relates to a breach of contract issue, it nevertheless supports the 
notion that in virtually every contract, especially in an attorney-client 
relationship, the parties would be contracting to fair and reasonable charges, 
otherwise the contract would be reduced to absurdity. 
The Firm also argues that Deanna, without other supporting expert 
opinion, legal authority or otherwise, merely "disputes" the unpaid balance 
claimed the Firm was owed and that her affidavit and statements made upon 
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information and belief should be disregarded. The Firm also draws this 
Court's attention to the case of Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp.. 
508 P.2d 538, 542 (Utah 1973) for the following statement made in that 
case: "Defendant's opposing affidavit reveals no evidentiary facts but 
merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions in 
regard to the transactions." This exact argument, except for the recitation to 
the Walker case, is basically the same argument Deanna made to the trial 
court with regard to the Firm's case. The Firm provides no evidentiary 
support, no supporting expert opinion, no legal authority or otherwise, that 
would suggest or prove that its billing is accurate, fair or reasonable, or that 
it performed all of its contractual obligations. The only evidentiary support 
supporting the Firm's case as shown in the appellee brief on page 5 is the 
Affidavit of Shawn T. Farris in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. The Affidavit of Shawn T. Farris contains no evidentiary facts 
but merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and conclusions in 
regard to the transactions. 
However, to the contrary, Deanna's affidavit in support of her 
opposition to the motion for summary judgment sets forth fact after fact 
supporting her case, and Deanna also supports her affidavit with numerous 
exhibits supporting the facts as recited in her affidavit. The quote the Firm 
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uses from Deanna's affidavit is the only example it can show to support its 
position. In contrast, Deanna's affidavit sets forth numerous facts with 
regard to the transactions with the Firm. Mr. Farris's affidavit on the Firm's 
behalf lacks evidentiary weight as it highlights only his opinions and 
conclusions. Mr. Farris had virtually no contact or communication with 
Deanna throughout the course of the Firm's representation of Deanna. The 
trial court apparently relied on an ineffective affidavit to support its finding 
that there was enough evidence to support a finding of summary judgment. 
III. The Record Clearly Provides Genuine Issues of Material Facts 
Supporting Deanna's Counterclaims. 
The Firm fails to address the majority of the arguments placed before 
this Court in the Brief of Appellant addressing the trial court's dismissal of 
Deanna's counterclaims. The Firm again argues that it mistakenly mailed 
the May 7, 2003 invoice, and that once the clerical error was discovered, the 
Plaintiff informed Deanna of this clerical mistake. Again, the Firm informed 
Deanna of this clerical mistake by way of a summary judgment response 
pleading, replacing this "clerical mistake" with a "Sample Invoice." This is 
an issue of material fact that should be placed before a jury. 
The Firm states in its argument the following: "[T]he affidavit of an 
adverse party must contain specific evidentiary facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. (Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 
13 
1985))." Deanna's affidavit filed in opposition to the Firm's summary 
judgment clearly sets forth facts that show there is a genuine issue for trial 
The Firm also argues that there are not any other affidavits filed in the 
record that supports Deanna's arguments that the Firm's fees were 
unreasonably calculated, not incurred, or improperly calculated. The Firm, 
however, in its argument, pointed out that the May 7,2003 invoice was 
improperly calculated, a clerical error, if you will. 
Deanna's affidavit and exhibits supporting that affidavit create 
material issues of fact. Also, the only evidence the Firm uses to support its 
case is the Affidavit of Shawn T. Farris. The Firm itself did not provide to 
the trial court any expert opinion, any legal authority or any other 
evidentiary support other than Mr. Farris's mere statements of his beliefs 
and opinions to support the reasonableness of the fees billed. The only 
evidence the Firm put forth supporting its allegations and denials in this case 
is the Affidavit of Shawn T. Farris, not the Affidavit of Eric Gentry, a billing 
ledger, and a "Sample Invoice." 
IV. The Trial Court Improperly Awarded Attorney's Fees in 
This Case. 
Again, to be clear, from the inception of this case, the Firm is the 
party that has continually referred to this case as a "simple debt collection 
case," not Deanna. Deanna counterclaimed for breach of contract, etc., not 
14 
to collect a debt. The Firm argues that it incurred attorney fees to prosecute 
its breach of contract action and to defend against Deanna's counterclaims. 
The only argument presented by the Firm with regard to the award of 
attorney fees in this case and the fee agreement language providing for the 
award of attorney fees to collect a "delinquent account" is that the "Trial 
Court correctly recognized this type of argument presented by the Defendant 
as a 'imaginative parsing of contract language to avoid its clear intent.'" 
Unfortunately, other than the above statement, Judge Beacham's ruling 
failed to address the contract language at all. It is also interesting to note 
that the Firm failed to respond to Deanna's argument that the trial court was 
required to make the Firm's attorneys comply with U.R.C.P. Rule 73(b) in 
its award of attorney fees in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
The Firm takes issue with Deanna setting forth the same arguments 
she raised at the trial court level. However, it is Deanna's view that for 
purposes of appeal, you can only raise the issues and law presented to the 
trial court; in other words, the issues were preserved below. As to the 
Firm's arguments in its brief, most, if not all, of the arguments and case law 
provided were not presented to the trial court for consideration and therefore 
not preserved for purposes of appeal. The Firm's motion for summary 
15 
judgment as to its breach of contract action was based upon the wrong 
standard of law, and the trial court failed to view Deanna's facts and 
inferences in a light most favorable to her. The Firm avers to Defendant's 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment in its conclusion, yet Defendant made 
no cross-motion for summary judgment. 
The trial court clearly erred when he failed to apply the correct 
standard of law to the Firm's breach of contract cause of action. The trial 
court clearly erred by his failure to view the facts and inferences therefrom 
in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and look at those facts and 
inferences as a whole to determine if a cause of action exists for Deanna. 
The trial court clearly erred by his failure to review the Answer and 
Counterclaim and all the documents presented before him by Deanna to 
determine that Deanna did plead appropriately all her causes of action. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate the summary ruling, vacate the 
judgment, vacate the award of attorney fees, and remand the case back for 
jury trial on the merits of the case. 
16 
Deanna also asks this Court to award her attorney fees and costs on 
appeal. 
DATED: May 9-T.2005. 
MICHAEL SANFT 
Attorney for Appellant Deanna Pugh 
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